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POLICY CHALLENGE
The EU fiscal framework has come under attack more because of the timing
of the application of the new rules than for substantive reasons. The frame-
work entered into force when most euro-area countries were under the
Excessive Deficit Procedure. Linked to this is the fact that the six-pack sug-
gests that the new surveillance procedure enters into force after EU coun-
tries have corrected nominal fiscal deficits. We argue that: a) fiscal
surveillance should be prioritised over enforcement of sanctions for exces-
sive deficits; b) it is inconsistent to allow for exceptional circumstances,
while not recognising up-front the role of surveillance; c) there is scope to
decide that slow growth at member state level and EU levels acts as a con-
straint on fiscal consolidation: it should be done ex ante in a way that allows
governments to use the Commission’s forecasts in their Stability Pro-
grammes, and must be decided by the Commission and not by the Council.
THE ISSUE The strengthening of the European Union’s fiscal rules with the
approval of the so-called ‘six-pack’, and the parallel worsening of economic
conditions in Europe, re-opened the debate about the relationship between
fiscal discipline and growth. Influential voices have argued against the EU’s
perceived obsession with fiscal discipline, which risks being self-defeating in
bad times. However, EU fiscal rules are not as rigid as commonly thought, but
represent a sophisticated system of surveillance and ex-post control that
provides sufficient room for manoeuvre under exceptional circumstances.
Source: Bruegel.
2012 → 2013 → 2014 onwards
Potential sanctions under
Preventive Arm
Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Luxembourg
All countries
Potential sanctions under
Corrective Arm
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain
Austria, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Malta, Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain
All countries
Time inconsistency in the application of the new SGP rules
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1. See, for example, the
Vox Debate 'Has
austerity gone too far?',
available at
http://www.voxeu.org/d
ebates/has-austerity-
gone-too-far.
2. Exceptions are made
for countries under
programme (ie Greece,
Ireland and Portugal),
whose commitments
are defined in their
respective adjustment
programmes.
3. European
Commission (2012b).
THE TIGHTENING OF EUROPEAN
UNION FISCAL RULES through the
Fiscal Compact, which was signed
in March 2012, and through the so-
called six-pack regulations that
entered into force in December
2011, comes at a time of
worsening economic conditions in
Europe. This unfortunate timing
has re-opened the debate about
the relationship between fiscal
discipline and growth, and has
provoked a wave of criticism from
governments and academics
about the EU’s perceived
obsession with fiscal discipline,
and the potential in bad times for
this to be self-defeating1.
It is certainly the case that the
new, tougher rules on excessive
deficits have been introduced at a
time of exceptional circum-
stances, which will severely test
the new system. When the new
rules entered into force, 14 of the
17 euro-area countries (ie all
except Estonia, Finland and Lux-
embourg) were under the Exces-
sive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and
were committed to bringing their
deficits to below 3 percent of GDP
by 2012 (Belgium and Cyprus) or
2013 (12 others)2. Yet EDP coun-
tries face low or even negative
growth prospects especially for
2012, as acknowledged by the
Commission3. Thus, they could
face sanctions for excessive
deficits, whether in 2013 or a year
later as recently decided for Spain,
even before the EU is able to use
its new surveillance tools to moni-
tor structural fiscal positions.
But the debate about timing
should not be allowed to detract
from a measured analysis of the
new framework. In fact, the EU fis-
cal rules are well designed, offer
an often-underestimated flexibil-
ity, and are a useful contribution to
the functioning of European mone-
tary union. It would be a shame if
the credibility of the rules were to
be undermined because of the
timing of their introduction.
Policymakers need to take this
into account. In the current
economic situation – with slow
growth and high unemployment in
many euro-area countries – it is
important that the room for
manoeuvre provided by the
Treaties and the new six-pa ck is
fully exploited, possibly with some
minor corrections to the process.
For the first test of the new rules to
be negotiated successfully, timing
is everything.
For a smoother transition from the
old to the new regime, we suggest
a simple rule that will allow a
'smart' application of the six-pack
provisions without undermining
them. We start in the next section
by outlining the main features of
the new fiscal framework. In the
third section, we discuss the size
of the required correction, the rele-
vance of arguments about its
potentially self-defeating nature,
and the notion of ‘exceptional cir-
cumstances’. We conclude in the
final section with suggestions to
ameliorate the risks that might
arise because of the timing of the
first application of the rules.
THE NEW RULES EXPLAINED
The Fiscal Compact (a part of the
Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance – TSCG) will be an
important addition to the EU's fis-
cal architecture. It will enter into
force when at least 12 euro-area
countries have ratified it, which
could happen in early 2013. In the
meantime the EU fiscal rules are
laid down in the six-pack, the set of
six regulations that entered into
force on 13 December 2011, and
which form the backbone of the
Fiscal Compact. Both the six-pack
and the Fiscal Compact aim to
strengthen fiscal surveillance and
improve enforcement by granting
the European Commission powers
to impose sanctions on countries
that have failed to make sufficient
progress towards more sustain-
able (structural) fiscal positions
and/or to correct excessive
deficits. The six-pack introduces
rules both in the preventive and
the corrective arms of the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP).
On 23 November 2011, the Com-
mission made two additional regu-
latory proposals, known as the
two-pack, which introduce
enhanced monitoring of euro-area
countries that risk non-compli-
ance with the deficit criterion, and
more clearly-defined surveillance
and monitoring of countries receiv-
ing financial assistance.
The preventive arm
The preventive arm of the SGP
invites member states to achieve a
balanced budget in the medium
term. The ‘balanced budget’ provi-
sion has been there since the very
first version of the Stability Pact,
but deviations have never been
sanctioned. Under the six-pack
provisions, they will be.
The structural balance
The preventive arm of the SGP is
concerned with surveillance and
early detection and correction of
unbalanced fiscal positions. As
deficit levels may be affected by
unfavourable growth conditions,
rather than signalling discre-
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4. Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes are
medium-term fiscal
plans which euro-area
countries and countries
that are preparing for
accession respectively
need to submit to the
EU in the Spring every
year in the framework
of the SGP provisions.
5. The Fiscal Compact
revises the lower limit
to 0.5 percent of GDP,
and adds that a MTO of
minus 1 percent of GDP
may only be allowed in
countries whose public
debt is significantly
below 60 percent of
GDP.
6. European Council
(1997).
7. The six-pack imposes
also an expenditure
benchmark. Sanctions
may thus be imposed
also on deviation of
actual expenditure from
the benchmark but here
the excess over the
benchmark is not quan-
tified. The final decision
on sanctions is taken
by the European Com-
mission and may only
reversed by the Council
(2011a).
8. See Regulation
1466/97.
9. European Commis-
sion (2012a). 
tionary measures that are exces-
sively expansionary, the fiscal
aggregate that is used for the sur-
veillance exercise is the so-called
medium-term budgetary objective
(MTO), which is a country’s cycli-
cally adjusted (or structural) budg-
etary position net of one-off and
temporary measures. This aggre-
gate is typically assessed over the
medium-term (ie about three
years, the typical time horizon of
Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes)4. The reference value for
the MTO is a structural balance but,
in reality, each country has the
freedom to pick its own MTO follow-
ing a commonly agreed measure-
ment methodology, provided the
target does not exceed a deficit of
1 percent of GDP5.
MTOs have always been central to
the exercise of fiscal surveillance
under the SGP. The original text of
1997 already called on EU
countries to adhere to “the
medium-term objective of
budgetary positions of close to
balance or surplus”6. The 2005
Stability Pact reform introduced
the concept of country-specific
MTOs, for which each member
country can identify its own target
provided this guarantees an
appropriate safety margin with
respect to the 3 percent target.
Table 1 sets out the MTOs and
sanctions contained in the SGP
and six-pack7.
Deviations from MTOs are allowed.
They are accepted if a country has
implemented structural reforms
(eg pension reform) that may be
costly in the short-term but con-
tribute to debt sustainability. Devi-
ations are also allowed if they
result from “an unusual event out-
side the control of the Member
State concerned... or in case of
severe economic downturn for the
euro area or the Union as a
whole”8. This is a further novelty
from the six-pack, namely the
appreciation of aggregate circum-
stances, on top of country-specific
exceptional circumstances. The
provision addresses the problem
of possible negative growth spirals
when all countries reduce public
consumption in bad aggregate
conditions9.
The transition from the old to the
new regime
At present, the new preventive-
arm regime only applies to euro-
area countries that are not under
EDP (ie Estonia, Finland, and Lux-
embourg). It will only apply to the
other countries after they have
corrected their excessive deficits
and formally exited the EDP. This
implies that, for most countries,
the new regime and the ensuing
sanctions on medium-term com-
mitments will be enforced from
2014, by which time it will pre-
sumably be strengthened by the
Fiscal Compact (Table 2 on the
next page).
Box 1 describes the main features
of the TSCG Treaty, of which the Fis-
cal Compact is a part, and the
extent to which it adds to the six-
pack rules. The Fiscal Compact
recognises the importance of the
structural balance, above and
beyond deficit levels. However, the
commitment of the contracting
parties to include a debt brake rule
either in their constitutions or via a
similarly binding regulation, risks
making the system more rigid at
home than what it really is at EU
level, at least in some countries.
The corrective arm
The new provisions on the Stability
Pact’s corrective arm foresee sanc-
tions not only for excessive
deficits but also for excessive
debts (Table 3 on page 4). The pro-
visions also strengthen enforce-
Medium-term
objective
Adjustment effort Sanctioning system
First SGP
(1997)
Close to balance or
surplus
No minimum adjustment effort No sanctions
Revised
SGP (2005)
Country-specific
medium-term budget-
ary objective (MTO)
< - 1% of GDP
Minimum annual adjustment in the structural bal-
ance of 0.5% of GDP 
No sanctions
Six Pack
(2011)
Country-specific
medium-term budget-
ary objective (MTO)
< - 1% of GDP
Minimum annual adjustment in the structural bal-
ance of at least 0.5% of GDP or > 0.5% of GDP in
high-debt countries
Sanctions (ie interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of
GDP) in case of lack of effective action on deviation
of structural balance from target that is at least
0.5% of GDP in one year or deviations from mini-
mum annual adjustment effort (7-8 months after
initial warning from the Commission)
Source: Bruegel.
Table 1: The changing definition of the medium-term objective
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10. Ireland held a refer-
endum on 31 May
2012, voting in favour
of ratification.
11. See footnote 7.
12. Article 7 of the TSCG
treaty states: “…The
Contracting Parties
whose currency is the
euro commit to sup-
porting the proposals or
recommendations sub-
mitted by the European
Commission where it
considers that a Mem-
ber State of the Euro-
pean Union whose
currency is the euro is
in breach of the deficit
criterion in the frame-
work of an excessive
deficit procedure. This
obligation shall not
apply where it is estab-
lished among the Con-
tracting Parties whose
currency is the euro
that a qualified majority
of them…is opposed to
the decision proposed
or recommended”.
2012 → 2013 → 2014 onwards
Potential sanctions under
Preventive Arm
Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg
All countries
Potential sanctions under
Corrective Arm
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Malta,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain
Austria, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Malta, Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain
All countries
Source: Bruegel.
Table 2: Time inconsistency in the application of the new SGP rules
BOX 1: THE TSCG TREATY 
The TSCG is an intergovernmental treaty, signed by 25 of the 27 EU countries. It needs to be ratified by
national parliaments and may be subject to referendum in some member states10. The length of ratification
processes hinges on the timing of the application of the treaty provisions, but in all likelihood the TSCG will
enter into force in early 2013. The Fiscal Compact builds on the six-pack and repeatedly refers to it, but is dif-
ferent in three main respects:
• The TSCG Treaty is an intergovernmental treaty, whereas the six-pack is based on the Lisbon treaty and
therefore respects the Community method. Under the Community method, the European Commission is
at the centre of the legislative process. The TSCG puts member governments at the centre of the decision-
making process. Even if Article 7 of the TSCG invites governments to support the European Commission’s
recommendations, the Council remains the final decision-maker. 
• The Fiscal Compact is an instrument to guarantee debt sustainability rather than to fight excessive
deficits. The TSCG Treaty text mainly addresses the question of MTOs with a threshold that is lower than
envisaged in the six-pack11. To reinforce the balanced-budget objective, the Fiscal Compact further
requires that a rule be introduced in national legislation that is as binding as a constitutional rule would
be.
• Failure to transpose the balanced-budget rule into national legislation gives any EU member state a right
to refer to the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) for an opinion. A fine may be applied if a country fails to respond
to an ECJ request. 
• The Fiscal Compact further strengthens the role of the European Commission vis-à-vis the Council, as it
states that all Commission proposals and recommendations may be considered as automatically applied
unless the Council rejects them by qualified majority at every stage of the EDP12.
Initial legal act Scope of document Follow-up by Commission Follow-up by Council
Council decision Establishing existence
excessive deficit (EDP) (QMV,
except MS)
Within 20 days, the Commission
shall recommend non-interest-
bearing deposit (mainly in the
presence of interest-bearing
deposit)
• Council may reject Commis-
sion recommendation (RQMV)
• Council may amend Commis-
sion recommendation (QMV)
Council recommendation Recommending corrective
action and timeline (at least
0.5% of GDP of cyclically
adjusted balance per annum or
above in high-debt countries)
Council decision Establishing no effective action
taken (QMV, except MS)
Within 20 days, the Commission
shall recommend a fine
• Council may reject Commis-
sion recommendation (RQMV)
• Council may amend Commis-
sion recommendation (QMV)
Source: Bruegel.
Table 3: The corrective arm of the SGP
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13. ‘Spain defies EU
over deficit rules’,
Financial Times, 2
March 2012.
14. Under the European
Semester, EU member
states must submit by
30 April every year their
Stability or Convergence
Programmes and their
National Reform Pro-
grammes. The Commis-
sion assesses the
documents and provides
country-specific recom-
mendations. The Council
adopts the country-spe-
cific recommendations
based on the Commis-
sion proposal.
15. Only Spain was
granted an extension
up to 2014.
16. For all countries for
which the deadline for
correction is 2013 the
distance from the 3%-tar-
get is simply the differ-
ence between the 2012
deficit in the Stability
Programme and the level
in the Commission’s
Spring Forecast, as the
Commission’s forecast
for 2013 includes fiscal
measures not yet
approved. In other words,
we assume very opti-
mistically that the cor-
rection in the following
year will lead to exactly
the same result that has
been forecast by the
government in the latest
Stability Programme.
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initially announced by the govern-
ment, provided the country
remained committed to a deficit
lower than 3 percent of GDP in
2013. Moreover, the Commission
announced on 30 May that it is
prepared to grant Spain a one-year
extension to the deadline in the
light of poor growth condition in
the framework of the presentation
of the country-specific recommen-
dations which the Commission
publishes every year under the
European Semester process14. On
20 July, the Council approved the
one-year extension at the same
summit in which Spain was
granted EU financial assistance to
recapitalise its banking system.
The size of the correction
The Commission's May 2012 fore-
casts provide a good indication of
which countries are under pres-
sure to meet the EDP’s targets by
the agreed deadline and may risk
sanctions, unless they implement
extraordinary fiscal packages or
obtain deadline extensions. Figure
1 provides a snapshot of nominal
deficits in the euro-area countries
currently under EDP excluding pro-
gramme countries. Columns out-
lined in black indicate each
country’s original deadline15. The
countries off track are those for
which the Commission had sig-
nalled problems back in November
2011, ie mainly Slovenia, Slovakia,
France and Spain, but also Cyprus
and the Netherlands.
Our figures are rather conservative
as they do not account for worse-
than-expected fiscal outcomes for
2012. Nevertheless, the size of the
correction over 2012-13 is in some
cases significant. To see this, we
distinguish between corrective
measures that have already been
envisaged in the April 2012 Stabil-
ity Programmes, which we classify
as 'planned', and the extraordinary
measures that are not planned but
deemed necessary to comply with
the agreed deadline; these are
classified as 'extra' and are calcu-
lated as the gap between the
deficit forecast by the Commission
and the 3 percent of GDP level in
the target year16.
Figure 2 on the next page shows
the cumulative size of the planned
correction in euro-area countries
and the extra effort needed. The
average planned consolidation
effort across the relevant 11 euro-
area countries is about 2.75 per-
cent of GDP, calculated as the
difference in the deficit at the end
ment. In fact, the new excessive
deficit procedure imposes sanc-
tions quite early on in the process
and is overall quicker than before.
From a procedural perspective, it is
significant that the final decision
on sanctions now takes the form of
a Commission recommendation,
which is dealt with by reversed
qualified majority voting (RQMV) in
the Council, meaning the Council is
not required to confirm the recom-
mendation, but can block it.
DEFICIT REDUCTION IN BAD TIMES
As we have discussed, much of the
debate on the undesirability of
synchronised fiscal contraction in
the EU relates to the need for most
euro-area countries to adjust their
deficits at a time of slow growth.
Some countries will need to imple-
ment additional deficit reduction
measures to meet their deficit tar-
gets by the agreed deadline.
In November 2011, the European
Commission forecast that six euro-
area countries would be unable to
meet the deficit target by the
deadline laid down in the latest
EDP recommendation, unless
extraordinary fiscal measures
were introduced. These countries
were Belgium, Cyprus, France,
Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain. Bel-
gium and Cyprus, whose deadline
is end-2012, immediately
approved austerity measures in
December 2011.
On 2 March 2012 the Spanish gov-
ernment said it would not be able
to meet the 2012 deadline13.
Spain's unorthodox unilateral
announcement was followed by a
compromise decision taken by the
Eurogroup, whereby Spain's 2012
target was set at 5.3 percent of
GDP compared to the 5.8 percent
CY BE SI SK MT FR ES NL AT DE IT
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Source: European Commission’s Spring Economic Forecast, 2012.
Figure 1: Expected evolution of deficit levels, 2011, 2012 and 2013
of 2013 compared with the level in
2011, implying an annual nominal
fiscal cut-back of close to 1.4 per-
cent of GDP. It is not desirable to
retrench in extremely slow growth
periods but the figure is probably
not dramatic either. But the extra
effort necessary to meet the tar-
gets in some countries and its
likely impact on neighbours, which
is not normally quantified by EU
institutions, are more worrying.
Spain, Slovenia, Cyprus, Slovakia,
France, Spain and the Netherlands
need to introduce additional meas-
ures above those already planned
in their 2012 Stability Pro-
grammes, leaving the total
(planned plus extra, where neces-
sary) and cumulated consolida-
tion effort in 2012 and 2013 at an
impressive 6.6 percent of GDP in
Spain17, 6.1 percent in Cyprus, 4.7
percent in Slovenia, and at a more
moderate 2.3 percent in France, 2
percent in Slovakia, and 1.9 per-
cent in the Netherlands.
Exceptional circumstances
The size of the fiscal correction in
2012 and 2013 is considerable,
especially for some countries, and
raises concern about extreme aus-
terity in the euro-area countries
with excessive deficits. While the
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17. This is now spread
over three years
instead of two.
18. See for example IMF
(2010), which calculates
that a fiscal consolidation
equal to 1 percent of GDP
typically reduces GDP by
about 0.5 percent. A key
point of the research on
non-Keynesian effects
builds on the role of
expectations. The idea is
that fiscal adjustment
may generate economic
growth if rational eco-
nomic agents also expect
their own government to
be virtuous in the future
(leaving fiscal pressure
unchanged) and would in
turn continue to con-
sume and invest even
under austerity. Yet, the
possibility of continuing
consumption and invest-
ment even at times of
diminishing aggregate
demand is a function of
the availability of credit
(or of the absence of
credit constraints), which
is a condition that is not
fully satisfied at present.
19. For example, the cur-
rent EDP was launched
for most countries in
2009 and dismal growth
conditions plus the crisis
explain why the dead-
line for correction was
set so much in advance,
an early indication of the
‘intelligent’ flexibility of
the fiscal framework.
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exact size of fiscal multipliers
remains the subject of debate, it is
now generally accepted that
deficit reductions depress eco-
nomic growth rather than produce
so-called non-Keynesian expan-
sionary effects, at least under the
conditions prevailing in the periph-
eral euro-area countries18.
Growth forecasts are already dis-
appointing without accounting for
the recessionary impact of addi-
tional fiscal retrenchment. Table 4
provides the latest available data
for real GDP growth in 2012 and
2013. A crucial element is the GDP
forecast for 2012, as this is the
year in which a large part of the
adjustment is supposed to take
place in order to allow timely
deficit correction by 2012 (Bel-
gium and Cyprus) and by 2013 (all
others but Spain). Negative growth
is expected in 2012 in Cyprus,
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and
Slovenia. These discouraging fig-
ures partly explain why the adjust-
ment in these countries' nominal
deficits needs to be so significant
to compensate for dismal busi-
ness-cycle conditions.
Most interestingly, both the origi-
nal SGP and its revised form under
the six-pack allow for exceptional
and temporary excessive deficits
when the economic downturn is
especially severe both in each
country and across the Union. This
is one clear example of the SGP's
flexibility. The texts of the regula-
tion define a severe economic
downturn as “negative annual GDP
volume growth rate or an accumu-
lated loss of output during a pro-
tracted period of very low annual
GDP volume growth relative to its
potential”. A severe economic
downturn may be either country-
specific or EU-wide. Exceptional
circumstances give rise to the fol-
lowing adjustments: i) the Com-
mission and the Council may
decide not to initiate an EDP, ii) the
target may be set for a much later
period19, iii) the Commission and
the Council may agree to allow a
one-year extension of the deadline
for correction. We argue that the EU
should make full use of the refer-
ence in the new rules to the overall
EU economic situation. We further
suggest that the one-year exten-
sion is granted as early as possi-
ble, ideally before member states
submit Stability Programmes to
the EU, and under some other con-
ditions. We will address these
issues in the next section.
CY BE SI SK FR ES NL AT DE IT
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Source: Bruegel based on National Stability Programmes and Commission’s Spring
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Figure 2: Cumulative size of deficit reduction 2012-13, % of GDP
New forecast Previous forecast
2012 2013 2012 2013
AT 0.8 1.7 0.9 -0.2
BE 0 1.2 0.9 -0.3
CY -0.8 0.3 0 -1.5
DE 0.7 1.7 0.8 0.2
ES -1.8 -0.3 0.7 -1.7
FR 0.5 1.3 0.6 -0.1
IT -1.4 0.4 0.1 -0.3
MT 1.2 1.9 1.3 -0.1
NL -0.9 0.7 0.5 -0.6
SI -1.4 0.7 1 -0.8
SK 1.8 2.9 1.1 0
Source: European Commission
Economic Forecast, May 2012
Table 4: Real GDP growth forecasts
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Some of the apparent weaknesses
in the EU's new fiscal governance
framework underestimate the flex-
ibility of the framework and do not
relate to substance but concern
the timing of the application of the
new rules. Euro area fiscal gover-
nance should address this timing
issue, which arises because:
• The enforcement of final sanctions
on excessive deficits precedes the
exercise of surveillance of under-
lying fiscal positions, a problem
related to transition times from the
old to the new regime.
• Exceptional circumstances apply
in the current low-growth envi-
ronment, but it is important that
the EU uses fully its provision on
the general economic situation,
and that the one-year extension
in the correction of the deficit is
decided in a timely manner.
Policy recommendations
The fiscal framework is not too
stringent, and may be success-
fully applied in the current context.
Minor adjustments can improve its
consistency and efficacy.
Exceptional circumstances: Deficits
above 3 percent of GDP should be
considered acceptable in euro-
area countries given the EU's poor
growth prospects, especially for
2012. This should be conditional:
the EU should bring forward the
provision under which euro-area
members are sanctioned in all
cases in which the annual adjust-
ment effort in their structural bal-
ance is lower than 0.5 percent of
GDP. In the following years, when
the general situation improves,
deficits of greater than 3 percent
should be allowed in all euro-area
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20. Much smaller adjust-
ments may be also nec-
essary in Germany,
Austria and Belgium,
even if the former are in
fact relatively close to a
balanced budget.
21. See Regulation
1466/97.
22. See also Hallerberg,
Marzinotto, and Wolff, ‘An
assessment of the Euro-
pean Semester’, Bruegel,
forthcoming.
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countries that face negative
growth in 2012-13, or particularly
low growth relative to potential,
again provided they stick to a min-
imum yearly adjustment of the
cyclically adjusted balance.
Surveillance: Following on from the
previous recommendation, the EU
should apply the principles of fis-
cal surveillance to countries
already under EDP and not just
those that are not. This means
countries may be punished for
deviations from their medium-
term positions or insufficient
progress, as envisaged under the
SGP's new corrective arm. Looking
at actual data, a recommendation
for corrective action under our
terms may only be addressed to
Malta and Slovakia, which are far
from the close-to-balance position
and are not taking sufficient meas-
ures (Table 5)20. Our recommenda-
tion is more stringent compared to
the EU fiscal framework, in which
poor growth exempts euro-area
countries from preventive and not
just corrective arm obligations.
The general economic environ-
ment: Deviations from the deficit
target should be allowed as early
as possible. Ideally, the decision
to grant an extra year to countries
that are already under an EDP
should be taken in time for euro-
area countries to design a corre-
sponding new fiscal strategy in the
Stability Programmes that they
must submit every year by 30 April
in the framework of the European
Semester, or at least before they
finalise budget negotiations for the
relevant year. We thus suggest
that, in the light of the general eco-
nomic situation in the euro area, a
one-year extension is granted
already in 2012 to all EU countries.
Ex-ante exceptional circum-
stances: As Stability Programme
forecasts need to be compared
with the most recent Commission
forecast21, it is desirable, post-
2012, that the Commission brings
forward the publication of the
Spring Economic Forecast by at
least one month to allow countries
to take it into account in the draft-
ing of their Stability Programmes.
This procedural change would also
improve cross-country compara-
bility of fiscal policy, and facilitate
the European Semester22. If this is
not possible, it would be desirable
to postpone submission of Stabil-
ity Programmes until mid May, con
trary to proposals contained in the
two pack, now under negotiation,
under which euro-area countries
shall submit fiscal plans earlier
than 30 April (and national draft
budgets by 15 October).
Credibility: The recognition of the
existence of very low EU growth
follows from the application of the
six-pack rules and should not be
considered a threat to the new sur-
veillance and enforcement frame-
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AT 0.40 0.10 -1.8
BE 0.45 0.05 -2.6
CY 2.15 0 -1.7
DE 0.35 0.15 -0.3
ES 1.05 0 -4.8
FR 0.60 0 -2.9
IT 1.50 0 0.1
MT -0.25 0.75 -3.1
NL 0.50 0 -2.5
SI 1.55 0 -1.9
SK 0.05 0.45 -4.6
Source: Bruegel.
Table 5: The size of structural
balance correction (% of GDP)
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FISCAL RULES: TIMING IS EVERYTHING
work. It should however be a non-
political process. At present, the
one-year extension is granted if
the Council backs the Commission
recommendation by a qualified
majority. But there is no reason for
not also having RQMV at this stage,
meaning the Council is not asked
to confirm a Commission’s pro-
posal but can only block it. RQMV
would more visibly leave the deci-
sion in the Commission’s hands,
strengthening the perception of
markets that the procedural
change has a technical and not a
political motivation. The rules laid
down in the TSCG Treaty may sup-
port this, as we explain below.
The role of the Fiscal Compact:
There are two important aspects of
the Fiscal Compact that make it
desirable for economic policy
coordination. First, while aligned
with the surveillance mechanism
envisaged in the six-pack, it
emphasises the structural-bal-
ance rule, thus reinforcing the idea
structural balances or debts. How-
ever, the timing of the new rules is
unhelpful. First, sanctions do not
apply for structural balances until
excessive deficits are corrected.
Second, the new rules enter into
force in a recession when most
euro-area countries are under EDP.
The first problem can be dealt with
by extending the new preventive
arm to countries that are under
EDP. The second problem can
already be dealt with in the exist-
ing rules. A one-year extension to
the deadline for deficit correction
may be granted in case of negative
growth in the EU, or in specific
countries. For 2012, given the gen-
eral economic situation, the one-
year extension should be granted
to all countries before they finalise
their budgets for 2013. Thereafter,
it is only important that the deci-
sion is taken earlier than normal,
ideally at the beginning of April,
and that it is mostly in the hands of
the Commission, as are other
steps in the EDP.
that underlying budgetary posi-
tions are more important than
nominal deficits. Second, it advo-
cates the application of RQMV at
every stage of the EDP, possibly
also where the six-pack does not
provide for it. Its successful ratifi-
cation will thus allow RQMV to be
used in all cases in which an
extension is allowed for deficit
reduction, without a formal revi-
sion of the six-pack. There is how-
ever a drawback in the Treaty that
relates to the obligation for each of
the contracting parties to adopt a
quasi-constitutional debt brake
rule. The risk is that national fiscal
policy becomes too restrictive, at
least in some countries, undermin-
ing the flexibility that the fiscal
framework enjoys at the EU level.
The new EU fiscal framework has
been designed to strengthen sur-
veillance and sanctioning in the
case of severe deviations from the
reference value, whether the devi-
ation concerns nominal deficits,
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